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ARGUMENT 
I. A SPOUSE'S CLAIM FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM IS NOT ONLY 
SEPARATE, UNDER UTAH LAW AND THE STIPULATED FACTS OF 
THIS CASE SEPARATE PER PERSON POLICY LIMITS ARE REQUIRED. 
At the hearing below, the trial court stated: "the law ought to be as [the Vierras' 
counsel] tells me it should be, because indeed the injury of the spouse is that spouse's injury, 
and it seems to me that it ought to be separately subject to compensation." (R. at 254, p. 5.) 
It is no surprise, therefore, that on appeal, the first point of Farmers' argument concedes that 
a spouse's claim for loss of consortium is separate from the other spouse's bodily injury 
claim. (Brief of Appellee ("Farmers' Brief), p. 3.) See also Hackford v. Utah Power & 
Light Co.. 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., dissenting). 
Thus, this case is no longer bogged down with any misconception that Mr. Vierra's 
loss of consortium claim pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11 for separate and distinct 
individual damages should be treated as if it were the same as Mrs. Vierra's claim for bodily 
injury damages. The issue is whether Farmers must allow its insured, Don Versaw, a 
separate policy limit for the separate injury to Mr. Vierra's marital interest.1 As explained 
in this Reply Brief, under Utah law and the stipulated facts of this case, Farmers must 
provide two separate per person policy limits. 
1
 Married persons have recognized interests in each other's company, society, 
cooperation, and affection. Boucher v. Dixie Medical Center, 850 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 
1992). Injury to this type of marital interest is evident when there is a "significant 
permanent injury to a [spouse] that substantially changes that [spouse's] life style". Utah 
Code Ann. §30-2-1 l(l)(a). Where, as here, a tortfeasor injures the marital relationship so 
severely that it renders a spouse incapable of "performing the types of jobs [he or she] 
performed before the injury", one of the three explicit bases for bringing a claim under the 
loss of consortium statute is satisfied. Utah Code Ann. §30-2-1 l(l)(a)(iii). 
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Farmers concedes that the "policy of automobile liability insurance issued to Mr. 
Versaw must insure him against loss from liability imposed by law, including liability 
pursuant to Utah's loss of consortium statute." (Farmers' Brief, p. 4.) "Regarding this 
question of loss of consortium as a separate claim," Farmers also admits that its "policy does 
say that if Utah treats loss of consortium as a separate claim, it'll bump up this 
minimum coverage to comply with Utah law . . ." (R. at 245, p. 24) (emphasis added.) 
Indeed, this concession is mandated by the two inconsistent loss of consortium paragraphs 
in Farmers' policy, which state: 
The bodily injury liability limit for "each person" is the maximum for bodily 
injury sustained by one person in any occurrence. Any claim for loss of 
consortium or injury to the relationship arising from this injury will be 
included in this limit. 
If the financial responsibility law of the place of the accident treats the loss 
of consortium as a separate claim, financial responsibility limits will be 
furnished.2 
(See R. 28 and Brief of Appellant Don Versaw, Addendum A) (bold italics added). 
Therefore, under the policy language itself, if loss of consortium claims are treated 
as separate claims in Utah, a separate per person policy limit must be provided. Based on 
applicable Utah law and the facts Farmers stipulated to for purposes of this Declaratory 
Action, Farmers' interpretation of its policy wrongly denies Mr. Versaw the coverage 
required in this situation because here there are two separate per person policy limit claims, 
one for bodily injury and one for loss of consortium. 
2
 As discussed below, this policy language is inherently ambiguous. The second 
paragraph of Farmers' policy essentially renders the first paragraph meaningless. 
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Farmers attempts to side step the fact that there are two distinct policy limit claims 
which require separate coverage under the loss of consortium statute, Utah Code Ann. §30-
2-11, and the Married Woman's Act, Utah Code Ann. §30-2-4, by arguing that neither Mr. 
Vierra nor Mrs. Vierra is limited in their ability to pursue excess policy judgments. 
(Farmers' Brief, p. 8.) Thus, Farmers simply ignores the impact of its per person coverage 
position by asserting that "regardless of her marital status, Mrs. Vierra can recover against 
Mr. Versaw for the injuries she suffered." (Farmers' Brief at p. 8.) This argument, however, 
misses the point. 
Farmers confuses Mrs. Vierra's right to recover all of her damages against Mr. 
Versaw with her right to settle with Mr. Versaw for one of the $30,000 per person coverages 
he purchased. By virtue of the Married Woman's Act, Mrs. Vierra has not only the right to 
individually pursue a judgment for the full extent of her damages from Mr. Versaw, she has 
the right to individually settle for his policy limits. 
Her ability and right to settle, rather than sue, is critical here. It is stipulated that Mrs. 
Vierra offered to settle her claims against Mr. Versaw for a per person policy limit of 
$30,000. (R. at 161.) It is also stipulated that Farmers responded in kind with a $30,000 
offer to Mrs. Vierra, but conditioned its offer on her husband's release of his loss of 
consortium claim. (R. at 161.) Based on these facts,3 the only thing that prevented Mrs. 
Vierra from settling is the fact that she is married. 
3
 Farmers' statement of the facts (Farmers' Brief, p. 2-3) differ from those 
stipulated to for this Declaratory Action and its appeal. Farmers' characterization of the 
facts should be disregarded. The facts stipulated to by Farmers (R. 160-1,205 and 231) are 
set forth in the Vierras' opening Brief at pages 6 and 7. 
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Thus, contrary to Farmers' assertions, the Married Woman's Act is impacted here and 
the Vierras' reliance on it and the Utah Constitution is appropriate.4 Mrs. Vierra could have 
and would have settled her claim if she had not been prevented from doing so because she 
was so badly injured that her husband also has a loss of consortium. (R. at 254, p. 14.) 
Farmers' position not only offends rights guaranteed by the Married Woman's Act 
and the Utah Constitution, it is completely contrary to the purpose of the loss of consortium 
statute. Because a loss of consortium claim can only arise in Utah when one spouse suffers 
a serious injury, insurance limits are often inadequate to compensate that spouse. The 
legislature presumably was aware of this and could not have intended to penalize either 
spouse by creating a statutory claim that requires a husband and wife to split a single per 
person insurance limit. In Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Center, Inc., 15 P.3d 1030, 
1034 (Utah 2000) this Court noted that "when called upon to interpret a statute, 'our primary 
goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant 
to achieve.'" Quoting Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). By enacting the loss 
of consortium statute, the legislature did not intend to further harm injured spouses. 
Therefore, based on the purpose and language of the loss of consortium statute and 
Farmers' concession that loss of consortium claims are distinct, and in light of the Married 
Woman's Act, the Utah Constitution, and the stipulated facts of this case, Farmers must 
furnish two separate per person insurance limits in an amount up to $30,000 each. 
4
 Farmers' interpretation of its policy language offends the Utah Constitution 
because it deprives Mrs. Vierra of the civil right and privilege of settling her claim, treats 
seriously inj ured people differently based on whether they are married and treats its insureds 
differently if they seriously injure married people. 
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IL READ TOGETHER, THE TWO LOSS OF CONSORTIUM PARAGRAPHS 
IN FARMERS' POLICY ARE HOPELESSLY AMBIGUOUS, 
With respect to ambiguity, Farmers frames the issue as "whether the Farmers policy 
provided to Mr. Versaw complies with Utah law and plainly limits the loss of consortium 
claim to a one person limit." (Farmers' Brief at p.7) (emphasis added.) Farmers' policy 
does not plainly limit the loss of consortium claim in that manner. Nor is it true that 
"Farmers policy informed Mr. Versaw that loss of consortium was included in the one 
person limit." (Farmers' Brief at p. 7) (emphasis added.) To make those assertions, Farmers 
must completely ignore the second loss of consortium paragraph in its policy. However, 
when the second paragraph, which incorporates "financial responsibility laws," is read with 
the first, the policy becomes hopelessly ambiguous and makes it impossible for Mr. Versaw, 
a lay person, to understand the actual loss of consortium coverages and limits purchased and 
provided. 
The trial court erred in rejecting arguments that Farmers' second paragraph creates 
ambiguity with this policy language: "If the financial responsibility law of the place of the 
accident treats the loss of consortium as a separate claim, financial responsibility limits will 
be furnished." (R. 254, p. 9) (emphasis omitted.) Farmers argued to the trial court that there 
is no ambiguity or inconsistency in this language, and on appeal it attempts to support that 
premise by further arguing in its Brief that it does not need to provide separate per person 
coverages because "Utah's Financial Responsibility Law is a specific body of law, which 
has no requirement for separate limits." (Farmers' Brief, p. 11) (emphasis added.) 
Farmers' Brief even capitalizes "Financial Responsibility Law." 
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There are several problems with Farmers' attempt to avoid this obvious ambiguity by 
arguing that it can incorporate "Utah Financial Responsibility Law." 
First, it is primarily the reference to "financial responsibility law" that makes the 
policy's two loss of consortium paragraphs, as read together, ambiguous. The capitalized 
term "Financial Responsibility Law" is relied on by Farmers in its Brief and the non-
capitalized terms is contained in the second paragraph of its policy, but neither that term nor 
the monetary limits for third-party loss of consortium claims under any financial 
responsibility law are defined anywhere in Farmers' policy.5 Moreover, the phrase 
"Financial Responsibility Law" is not defined or used in any of the statutes discussed in 
5
 Farmers' policy does not disclose what separate coverages and limits of 
coverage apply to loss of consortium claims in Utah where the "law . . . treats the loss of 
consortium as a separate claim," it merely indicates that "financial responsibility will be 
furnished." (R. at 28 and Brief of Appellant Don Versaw, Addendum A) (emphasis 
omitted.) The only applicable indication of coverage limits is in the Declaration which lists 
$30,000 for "each person" and $60,000 for "each occurrence." (R. at 28 and Brief of 
Appellant Don Versaw, Addendum A, p. 3.) 
Interestingly, just below the second loss of consortium paragraph is a permissive user 
provision which states: "We will provide insurance for an insured person, other than you or 
a family member, up to the limits of Utah's Financial Responsibility Law only of $25,000 
per person, $50,000 per occurrence for bodily injury, and $15,000 for property damage." 
(R. at 28 and Brief of Appellant Don Versaw, Addendum A) (emphasis omitted.) This 
reference to permissive users has nothing to do with loss of consortium and by its placement 
directly under the second loss of consortium paragraph, it makes Farmers' policy more 
confusing. This ambiguity is further compounded by additional references to "Financial 
Responsibility Laws" with different dollar limits in Farmers' policy. For example, on page 
9 of the policy the limits for "underinsured motorist" loss of consortium claims (which is 
inapplicable here) are listed as "$10,000 each person and $20,000 each occurrence." For 
whatever reason, Farmers left its third-party loss of consortium provision ambiguous by not 
including any coverage amounts. This ambiguity could have been easily corrected by 
referring to Utah's minimum statutory limits and then listing those limits as was done in 
Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dangleish. 2002 UT 59 ^ 14, 52 P.3d 1142. 
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Farmers' Brief. See Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-303 and §31A-22-304. As explained by 
counsel for Mr. Versaw at oral argument before the trial court, it is "wrong [for Fanners] to 
put th[e] burden on the insured and on the claimant to show what the law of the state is . . 
. that creates an ambiguity." (R. at 254, p. 20.) 
Second, it is surprising that Farmers would put such emphasis on the ambiguous 
phrase: "Financial Responsibility Law." Ten years ago, in Cullum v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993), this Court rejected similar language from a Farmers' 
automobile policy which purposed "to limit coverage provided to permissive users but [did] 
not identify the limits. Rather, it refer[red] to an undefined 'Financial Responsibility Law'." 
Cullum, 857 P.2d at 925. Cullum did not specifically reach the ambiguity issue before this 
Court. Instead, Cullum held that the policy's reference to "an undefined Financial 
Responsibility Law" violated Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-106.6 Cullum, 857 P.2d at 927. 
6
 It is also surprising that Farmers did not bring Cullum to the trial court's 
attention because the same firm that represents Farmers in this matter argued Cullum. Utah 
Code Ann. §31A-21-106 was not specifically raised below. However, the statutory 
incorporation issue was clearly presented in the briefs submitted to the trial court and during 
argument below. For example, the Vierras argued that Farmers' policy language 
places on Farmers' insureds, who are typically lay persons like Mr. 
Versaw, the burden of knowing and interpreting the law as it relates to the 
specific legal issue now before this court Thus, Farmers' policy language 
flags its own weakness and is therefore not only ambiguous it creates 
ambiguity because it is virtually impossible for lay persons to know what they 
are buying. This policy language forces Farmers insureds to either remain 
uncertain about the extent of their coverage, or to undertake an 
interpretation of the law. 
This alone is troublesome, but the ambiguity is made even worse where, as 
here, Farmers and its insured have undertaken an effort to interpret the law 
(continued...) 
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The rationale and result of Cullum, however, are equally applicable to the claim here that 
Farmers' policy is ambiguous. 
In Cullum, this Court discussed an insured's need to be able to determine from the 
policy itself exactly what coverages and limits he or she had purchased. The Court noted: 
"This goal would be defeated by allowing incorporation of substantive statutory provisions 
just as it would by allowing incorporation of other written material" Cullum, 857 P.2d at 
925. It then wrote: 
6(... continued) 
and have come to different conclusions about what the law is. The fact that 
Farmers takes one position while Mr. Versaw takes another, 
demonstrates the inherent ambiguity resulting from policy language 
which attempts to say one thing and then modifies that by an express 
incorporation of the [financial responsibility] law. In short, Farmers' 
policy is ambiguous because it requires lay insureds to reconcile Utah's 
financial responsibility and insurance laws with Utah's loss of consortium 
law, and further ambiguity results when their conclusions differ. 
(R. at 169-70) (emphasis added.) The problems with statutory incorporation were also 
addressed by the Vierras in their original Brief in this appeal: "The policy language in this 
case cannot be readily analyzed for ambiguity... because the language goes outside of the 
four corners of the policy and leaves to the insured and the courts the burden of 
determining, on the basis of indefinite reference [to "financial responsibility law"], 
whether one or two 'single person' policy limits are available." (See Brief of Appellants 
Arthur Vierra and Corina Vierra, p. 8) (emphasis added.) 
Under all of these circumstances it is appropriate to consider the effect of Utah Code 
Ann. §31A-21-106 on Farmers' argument that its policy is not ambiguous and is in 
compliance with Utah law. The issue was sufficiently raised and addressed below, even if 
the applicable statute is only specifically identified now. See IFG Leasing Company v. 
Gordon. 776 P.2d 607, n. 5 (Utah 1989) quoting Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 n. 4 
(Utah 1987) ("This Court may decide a case upon a proper ground even though not argued 
by the parties."); Romrell v. Zions First National Bank, N.A.. 611 P.2d 392, 295 (Utah 
1980) ("Court, in its discretion, may decide a case upon any points that its proper disposition 
may require, even if first raised in a reply brief") 
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This case presents an excellent example of the foregoing problem, for an 
owner insured under defendant's policy cannot determine his or her coverage 
solely by relying on the document. An important element - the amount of 
coverage provided for permissive users - is not disclosed. Intact, the insured 
would have great difficulty discovering exactly what coverage this policy 
provides. This policy does not specify the law to which it refers. 
CuUum,857P.2dat925. 
Farmers' policy is not only ambiguous because it does not specify the law to which 
it refers, but also its attempted incorporation of the "financial responsibility law" violates 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-106 as explained by Cullum. Therefore, Farmers' policy fails 
both parts of the two part analytical test Farmers urged on the trial court. Farmers' counsel 
argued that "when confronted with a contract issue, [the Court] should [first] look at the 
language of the contract. If it's clear and unambiguous on its face . . . then [it should] look 
at the statutory language to be sure that the contract language doesn't violate any of the 
statutory language." (R. at 254, p. 6.) Here the policy language is both ambiguous and in 
violation of Utah Code Ann, §31A-21-106. 
Third, even if the policy's phrase "financial responsibility law" refers to a "specific 
body of law" which is easily accessed by lay insureds, which it does not (see Cullum, 857 
P,2d at 924-6), and even if it were construed to consist of Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-303 
and/or §31A-22-304, Fanners' policy language remains ambiguous. As in Cullum, "[t]he 
policy at issue here fails to inform the insured of the amount of liability coverage provided 
[... despite the fact that,] to an insured, coverage amounts are the most critical features of 
an insurance policy." Cullum, 857 P,2d at 926. 
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Fourth, Farmers' argument that there is no language in the "Financial Responsibility 
Law" specifying that loss of consortium will be a separate claim (R. at 254, p. 25; Farmers' 
Brief, p. 11) misses the point. Even when omitting the words "financial responsibility," 
Farmers' policy speaks in terms of how Utah law "treats" a loss of consortium claim, not 
whether Utah law "specifies" it as a separate claim. Farmers concedes that "Utah's loss of 
consortium statute makes plain that one spouse's loss of consortium claim is separate and 
distinct from the other spouse's bodily injury claim." (Farmers' Brief, p. 4.) Therefore, its 
ambiguous policy language should not be allowed to define or otherwise limit the body of 
Utah law the trial court should have considered when analyzing the per person issue. At a 
minimum, the trial court should have analyzed all of the applicable Utah statutes and 
constitutional provisions which govern loss of consortium claims. In Cullum. Farmers 
conceded this point when it asserted that "all statutes are considered to be incorporated in 
every contract." CuUum, 857 P.2d at 925. 
Similarly, to the extent Utah does generally have financial responsibility laws, they 
must, at a minimum, be read in conformity with other applicable Utah statutes. As noted 
recently in Cazares v. Cosbv. 2003 UT 3, f 19, 65 P.2d 1184, 1188, this Court 
assumes that the legislature, in [enacting new statutes] was mindful of 
[existing statutes and their] related subject matter and wished [that both] be 
given effect. See Murray City v. Hall 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983) 
(citing 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction §51.02 (4th ed. 1973) 
for the proposition that legislatures know of statutes of related subject matter 
and have them in mind when enacting new statutes). 
The trial court should not have subordinated the Married Woman's Act (enacted in 1898) 
to the ambiguous language of Farmers' insurance policy or any subsequent statutes. It 
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should have read and construed all applicable statutory provisions together and applied them 
to the stipulated facts of this case. 
In summary, the ambiguity arising from Farmers' reference to and reliance on its 
policy's "financial responsibility law" language is not insignificant. Farmers correctly points 
out that ambiguity is not created just because one party to a contract interprets its language 
differently than another party. (Farmer's Brief, p. 9.) However, this is not such a case. The 
ambiguity arising from trying to reconcile the first loss of consortium paragraph with the 
second is inescapable. Certainly the meaning of this insurance policy would not "be plain 
to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing the matter fairly and 
reasonably, in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and in the light 
of existing circumstances, including the purpose of the policy." LPS Hospital v. Capital 
Life Insurance Company. 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1998). 
In terms of loss of consortium coverages and limits, Farmers sold Mr. Versaw an 
ambiguous policy. This ambiguity was created by Farmers' failure to understand or comply 
with the laws of Utah. Because Farmers attempts to exclude or limit loss of consortium 
coverage and limits with ambiguous language, that language must be strictly construed 
against it. US Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Sandt 854 P. 2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993). It is 
well settled that "ambiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract that is fairly 
susceptible to different interpretations should be construed in favor of coverage." U.S. 
Fidelity, at 854 P.2d at 522. 
Farmers owes Mr. Versaw two $30,000 per person limit coverages in this case. 
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III. EACH OF THE CASES CITED IN FARMERS' BRIEF FROM OTHER 
STATES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FOR MULTIPLE REASONS. 
Farmers relies on ten cases from other jurisdictions in support of its argument that its 
policy "clearly and unambiguously" provides that a loss of consortium claim is included in 
its one person policy limit. (Farmers' Brief, p. 9.) None of the ten cases cited in Farmers' 
Brief, however, deal in any way with the ambiguity that exists in the insurance policy before 
this Court, i.e., the ambiguity which arises when the first and second loss of consortium 
paragraphs are read together. Either these ten cases quote no similar or applicable policy 
language: Sweeden v. Farmers Insurance Group, 71 Ark. App. 381,30 S.WJd 783 (2000); 
Stewart v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 341 S.C. 143, 533 S.E.2d 
597 (2000); Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Dahlheimer, 3 P.3d 820 (Wyo. 2000); Teplyv. 
Ballard, 922 P.2d 1236 (Or. App. 1996); Farmers Insurance Co., Inc. v. Rosen, 839 P.2d 71 
(Kan. App. 1992); Campbell v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Arizona, 745 P.2d 160 (Ariz. App. 
1987); Bain v. Gleason, 726 P.2d 1153 (Mont. 1986); and Montgomery v. Farmers 
Insurance Group, Mid Century Insurance Company, 585 F. Supp. 618 at 619 (S.D. Ind. 
1984), or they analyze the two paragraphs in question without any reference to the ambiguity 
resulting from the second paragraph: Mid Century Insurance Co. v. Bash, 211 Cal. App. 3d 
431, 259 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1989); and Nollen v. Reynolds, 962 P.2d 633 (N.M. 1998). 
Therefore, these cases can neither help nor inform this Court's analysis of the Vierras' 
ambiguity argument and are clearly distinguishable. 
Similarly, none of the cases Farmers has cited from other jurisdictions address the 
specific arguments presented in this case. For example, none of the cited cases reconcile 
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their holdings with a Married Woman's Act (or like state law), or constitutional concerns 
similar to those raised here. There simply was no legal challenge under similar statutory or 
constitutional provisions in any of the cases Farmers cites. And, of course, none of them 
deal with the stipulated facts upon which this case was brought. For each of these reasons, 
all of Farmers' case authority is distinguishable. 
Some of the cases Farmers relies on do reach the conclusion that the phrase "financial 
responsibility law" refers to a specific body of law in their respective states , but those cases 
(for example, Nollen and Bash) are directly contrary to Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-106 and 
this Court's analysis in Cullum and Dangleish. Therefore, they are not authoritative and are 
again distinguishable. 
In summary, Farmers' Brief concedes, among other points, that the "policy of 
automobile liability insurance issued to Mr. Versaw must insure him against loss from 
liability imposed by law, including liability pursuant to Utah's loss of consortium statute." 
(Farmers' Brief, p. 4.) Its policy's confusing reference to and attempted incorporation of 
"financial responsibility law" on the critical issue of whether the law requires, or the policy 
provides, for one policy limit or two renders the policy both ambiguous and non-compliant 
with Utah law. Under these circumstances, the trial court's ruling that Farmers' policy 
requires Mr. Vierra's loss of consortium claim and Mrs. Vierra's bodily injury claim to be 
combined and reduced to a single person policy limit is erroneous. Farmers has cited no 
applicable cases to the contrary. 
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CONCLUSION 
Therefore, based on the purpose and language of the loss of consortium statute, 
Farmers' legal concessions, the Married Woman's Act, the Utah Constitution, the stipulated 
facts of this case, and the policy's ambiguity, Farmers must furnish Mr. Versaw two separate 
per person insurance limits in an amount up to $30,000 each. For the foregoing reasons, the 
judgment of the trial court should be reversed and judgment should be entered in favor of 
Mr. Versaw and the Vierras. 
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